The data is clear. As for the reasons of the lack of economic growth, and projections for Sub-Saharan countries, I feel there's a lot of mischaracterization. Like, A LOT.
Few things coming to mind:
1. The soverign debt crisis of 80s and 90s yielding 20 years of stagnation in many sub saharan countries. It's not written in the stone of "weak state capacity" alone. There are global phenomena, like higher commodity prices driven by China industrialization in 2000s leading to growth in many sub-saharan economies.
2. What from the outside looks like "all the same problems", from the inside you see A LOT of nuance. I live between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Corruption is present in both countries. Yet, in the first one, élite consensus on democratic transition of power creates a very different kind of corruption and political system and peace of mind of people. This stuff compounds in the long term. Just cuz Ghana has only 30M ppl. Doesn't mean it doesn't count.
3. Francophone countries with zero control on monetary policy vs countries like Nigeria that can see 3 digits devaluations in the span of one year. How much an economy is exposed to cureency shocks varies a lot and GDP in dollar terms can vary a lot.
4. The problem that a lot of newborns are born in weak/failed states (Mali, RDC...) is a problem of those states. It's not a problem of Sub-Saharan Africa. Can we stop comparing China and India to 40+ countries? The level of fragmentation is crazy. But instead of recognizing it, we just throw a "yess kinship matters more than civil society", bar sport anthropology. Let's look into RDC. Ans why it is so different than its neighbor, Rwanda, who has indeed made progress on reduction of extreme poverty.
Like, the analysis is good and all, but too much bias still when talking about the entity 'Sib Saharan Africa". Like guys things on the ground look veeerry different, a lot of different paths with uncertain developments. Every country is playing their game. Loom at Togo and Benin. Neighbors. Veeery different prpspects for the next 20 years. Not a single entity. Not a single future.
Also, population boom is a political, economic and geopolitical problem impacting African societies way more than the rest of the world. Just ask South Africans or Ivorians about immigration.
Thanks for the comment. As someone who's only vaguely aware of the political situation in West Africa, what are the differences in future prospects for Togo and Benin? Both seem to be democracies (though I know Benin recently had an failed coup attempt).
I think it worth noting too that WPP has overestimated future fertility, and even current population figures, so routinely that it is hard not to see the errors as intentional. This comes about because it is nearly axiomatic within international development that high fertility impedes a country’s development. It wasn’t long ago that population control was seen as a valuable development strategy, and I fear that this idea is not as dead as it might seem.
I do see some reason for hope: cheap distributed technologies like cell phones, batteries, and solar panels, can go a long way to kick-starting economic growth and especially to spread media to young women that will slow down birth rates.
A big problem though are dictators and wars. When present those are tough obstacles to overcome.
Will solar and batteries help commodity importers reduce their financial/monetary exposure to upward price shocks and even sometimes help oil and gas exporters by allowing more export or higher value uses of those commodities than electricity generation?
> If you were to describe this problem briefly, you could do quite well with something like “kinship groups crowd out effective institutions.” African societies have extraordinarily strong kinship ties, such that impersonal institutions and relationships are systematically subordinated to family, clan, and ethnic loyalties; as a result many African societies have found it extraordinarily difficult to build effective states and civil societies that are capable of doing what states and civil societies are supposed to do. (For a more complete elaboration of this view, see my article on why African nations don’t have large firms.) Solving that problem took Europe roughly a millennium; and that was when people didn’t have access to AK-47s.
It wasn't just Europe, China long ago built a large state more powerful than smaller familial units long ago (though the civil society was arguably too weak relative to that state). And growth-stifling society rather than a dysfunctional state is what inspired "How Nations Fail" to be supplemented with "The Narrow Corridor". But you note that India has been growing faster than Africa.
Great article. Quick note: the Noah Smith link is leading to your essay in American Affairs. I’m assuming it’s supposed to lead to a post by Smith or an episode of his podcast Hexapodia.
The data is clear. As for the reasons of the lack of economic growth, and projections for Sub-Saharan countries, I feel there's a lot of mischaracterization. Like, A LOT.
Few things coming to mind:
1. The soverign debt crisis of 80s and 90s yielding 20 years of stagnation in many sub saharan countries. It's not written in the stone of "weak state capacity" alone. There are global phenomena, like higher commodity prices driven by China industrialization in 2000s leading to growth in many sub-saharan economies.
2. What from the outside looks like "all the same problems", from the inside you see A LOT of nuance. I live between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Corruption is present in both countries. Yet, in the first one, élite consensus on democratic transition of power creates a very different kind of corruption and political system and peace of mind of people. This stuff compounds in the long term. Just cuz Ghana has only 30M ppl. Doesn't mean it doesn't count.
3. Francophone countries with zero control on monetary policy vs countries like Nigeria that can see 3 digits devaluations in the span of one year. How much an economy is exposed to cureency shocks varies a lot and GDP in dollar terms can vary a lot.
4. The problem that a lot of newborns are born in weak/failed states (Mali, RDC...) is a problem of those states. It's not a problem of Sub-Saharan Africa. Can we stop comparing China and India to 40+ countries? The level of fragmentation is crazy. But instead of recognizing it, we just throw a "yess kinship matters more than civil society", bar sport anthropology. Let's look into RDC. Ans why it is so different than its neighbor, Rwanda, who has indeed made progress on reduction of extreme poverty.
Like, the analysis is good and all, but too much bias still when talking about the entity 'Sib Saharan Africa". Like guys things on the ground look veeerry different, a lot of different paths with uncertain developments. Every country is playing their game. Loom at Togo and Benin. Neighbors. Veeery different prpspects for the next 20 years. Not a single entity. Not a single future.
Also, population boom is a political, economic and geopolitical problem impacting African societies way more than the rest of the world. Just ask South Africans or Ivorians about immigration.
Thanks for the comment. As someone who's only vaguely aware of the political situation in West Africa, what are the differences in future prospects for Togo and Benin? Both seem to be democracies (though I know Benin recently had an failed coup attempt).
There's some very thoughtful critique of the OWID data here:
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/qfFtXkuua2FQetYoy/demographic-uncertainty-and-the-future-of-extreme-poverty
I think it worth noting too that WPP has overestimated future fertility, and even current population figures, so routinely that it is hard not to see the errors as intentional. This comes about because it is nearly axiomatic within international development that high fertility impedes a country’s development. It wasn’t long ago that population control was seen as a valuable development strategy, and I fear that this idea is not as dead as it might seem.
I do see some reason for hope: cheap distributed technologies like cell phones, batteries, and solar panels, can go a long way to kick-starting economic growth and especially to spread media to young women that will slow down birth rates.
A big problem though are dictators and wars. When present those are tough obstacles to overcome.
Some of the data is inaccurate china’s median growth is not 20%.
Will solar and batteries help commodity importers reduce their financial/monetary exposure to upward price shocks and even sometimes help oil and gas exporters by allowing more export or higher value uses of those commodities than electricity generation?
> If you were to describe this problem briefly, you could do quite well with something like “kinship groups crowd out effective institutions.” African societies have extraordinarily strong kinship ties, such that impersonal institutions and relationships are systematically subordinated to family, clan, and ethnic loyalties; as a result many African societies have found it extraordinarily difficult to build effective states and civil societies that are capable of doing what states and civil societies are supposed to do. (For a more complete elaboration of this view, see my article on why African nations don’t have large firms.) Solving that problem took Europe roughly a millennium; and that was when people didn’t have access to AK-47s.
It wasn't just Europe, China long ago built a large state more powerful than smaller familial units long ago (though the civil society was arguably too weak relative to that state). And growth-stifling society rather than a dysfunctional state is what inspired "How Nations Fail" to be supplemented with "The Narrow Corridor". But you note that India has been growing faster than Africa.
Great article. Quick note: the Noah Smith link is leading to your essay in American Affairs. I’m assuming it’s supposed to lead to a post by Smith or an episode of his podcast Hexapodia.
I’ll fix!
So this begs the question, what to do about it?
I will address this question in future posts :)